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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ESSAYS
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS: A COMMENT
Richard S. Arnold*
These days, more and more opinions handed down by the
federal courts of appeals are marked "Not To Be Published," or
words to that effect. The purpose of this brief comment is to
examine the purpose of this new device, discuss some of the
effects it is having on the appellate process and the practice of
.law, and venture a few personal comments from one who has
produced probably hundreds of unpublished opinions, but has
always felt uneasy about it.
The whole thing appears to have started, so far as the
federal appellate courts are concerned, in 1964. In that year, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the governing body of
the lower federal courts for administrative purposes, issued a
general recommendation that judges publish only those opinions
"which are of general precedential value."'
Let's be clear,- at the outset, about the meaning of the word
"unpublished." The word does not mean "secret." As far as I
know, there are no secret judicial opinions in the federal system,
with the possible exception of opinions rendered by the
* United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit.
I. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Conference Reports
1962-64, at I I (1964).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1999)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Intelligence Surveillance Court, an institution before which
lawyers in private practice would have no occasion to appear.
All opinions are public; in the sense that they are available to the
public. Anyone may walk in off the street, pay the appropriate
fee, and get a copy of any opinion or order of a court of appeals.
Or, to describe the situation in more modem terms, anyone may
gain computer access to any opinion or order of a court of
appeals, usually without paying a fee. For example, all of the
opinions of my court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, are available without charge to anybody through
our web site, http://ls.wustl.edu/8th.cir. So we are not attempting
to hide our product. It is open to the public in general, and not
just to the parties to a given case, whether or not the opinion is
marked "Not To Be Published." What the phrase means is
something quite different; it means only that the opinion is not
to be published in a book, a printed medium. It means that the
opinion is not mailed (or otherwise transmitted) to West
Publishing Company or any other legal publisher with the
intention that it be printed in a book commercially available.
Why should anyone care if we send our opinions to a book
publisher, especially in this day and age, when computer
accessibility is so common? The answer lies in the use that
courts allow to be made of their unpublished opinions. To make
the point, I now set out in full the text of Eighth Circuit Rule
28A(i):
(i) Citation of Unpublished Opinion. Unpublished opinions
are not precedent and parties generally should not cite
them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case,
however, the parties may cite any unpublished opinion.
Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if
the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no
published opinion of this or another court would serve as
well. -A _party who cites an unpublished opinion in a
document must attach a copy of the unpublished opinion to
the document. A party who cites an unpublished opinion
for the first time at oral argument must attach a copy of the
unpublished opinion to the supplemental authority letter
required by FRAP 280). When citing an unpublished
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS: A COMMENT
opinion, a party must indicate the opinion's unpublished
status.2
The most. important provision of the rule occurs in the'first
sentence, which I repeat for emphasis: "Unpublished opinions
are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them."
As one who came to the bar almost forty years ago, I find this a
startling statement. "Unpublished opinions are not
precedent ...." The court is saying that it is not bound by its
unpublished opinions. In general, of course, the court on which I
sit, like all courts in common-law countries, recognizes the
doctrine of precedent. A court should not, without very good
reasons publicly acknowledged, depart from past holdings. Our
rule 28A(i) says, quite plainly, that this principle applies only
when the court wants it to apply. If we mark an opinion as
unpublished, it is not precedent. We are free to disregard it
without even saying so. Even more striking, if we decided a case
directly on point yesterday, lawyers may not even remind us of
this fact. The bar is gagged. We are perfectly free to depart from
past opinions if they are unpublished, and whether to publish
them is entirely our own choice. (On my court, the decision
whether to publish is, as a practical matter, always made by the
writing judge.)
Why would the federal courts take such a step, seemingly
so much at odds with traditional ways of adjudication? The
answer lies in one word, the same word that describes the most
serious problem facing all our courts today: volume. I will not
burden the reader with a flood of statistics, but a few will make
the point. In 1970, the courts of appeals disposed of 10,669
cases. Within ten years, this number had almost doubled, to
20,877. After another ten years, the number had almost doubled
again, to 38,520. In 1993, 47,790 appeals were disposed of, and
in 1997 the number was 51,194.' During this 'period of time,
2. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (adopted as of December 8, 1994). The predecessor rule was
much shorter and read as follows:
(k) Citation of Unpublished Opinion. No party may cite a federal or state court
opinion not intended for publication, except when the cases are related by
identity between the parties or the causes of action.
3. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 758 n.48 (1995); Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Report of the Director,
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have the numbers of appellate judges kept up with the numbers
of cases? Hardly. In 1970 there were 97 circuit judgeships.
There are now 167, and little prospect of any new ones being
created in the near future. So something had to be done, and
sometimes one gets the feeling that those in charge thought they
should do something, even if it was wrong. The federal system
has adopted a number of strategies to deal with this volume,
including more staff, with centrally located staff attorneys; a
smaller proportion of cases argued orally; less time allotted to
those cases that are argued; decisions by one-line order or brief
memorandum; and, of course, unpublished opinions. Judges
have been persuaded that a great deal of what they do lacks any
significance except to the parties, that some cases have no
"precedential significance," and that, therefore, nothing will be
lost by refusing to recognize them as precedent.
This practice disturbs me so much that it is hard to know
where to begin in discussing it. For one thing, I question the
proposition that any opinion lacks precedential value. There is
perhaps one group of cases of which this statement could
accurately be made. Under our practice, a practice that I believe
obtains in all of the federal courts of appeals, once a three-judge
panel decides an issue in a published opinion, other three-judge
panels are bound. They cannot overrule a prior panel opinion.
Only the court en banc can take this step. If, therefore, a case
arises in which the parties concede that a prior panel opinion
governs the issue, a second panel opinion doing nothing more
than following the previous opinion can truly be said to lack
precedential significance, and there would be no reason to allow
parties to cite it, when the earlier, governing opinion will serve
just as well.
With that exception, I would take the position that all
decisions have precedential significance. To be sure, there are
many cases that look like previous cases, and that are almost
identical. In each instance, however, it is possible to think of
conceivable reasons why the previous case can be distinguished;
and when a court decides that it cannot be, it is necessarily
holding that the proffered distinctions lack merit under the law.
This holding is itself a conclusion of law with precedential
at Table B-1 (1997). I commend Professor Dragich's excellent article to all those interested
in this subject. Her research is complete and her observations perceptive, in my opinion.
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significance. The following crude example comes to mind. One
party cites a previous opinion as binding precedent. The other
party says it is distinguishable, and, upon being asked why, says
that the previous case was argued on a Tuesday, whereas this
case is being argued on a Wednesday. This circumstance,
admittedly a factual difference, is obviously irrelevant. Why?
Because the factual difference-the day on which the case is
being argued-has nothing to do with the governing legal
principles. The example is extreme, and deliberately so, but I
believe it illustrates the point. Every case has some precedential
value, maybe not much, but some.
That being said, I would agree that many cases do not need
full opinions, that the distinctions offered between these cases
and previous decisions may be frivolous, and that, given the
shortness of human life, judges' time would be better spent on
hard cases than on tedious explanations of the easy ones. In this
sense, a case in which no arguably substantial distinction is
suggested from previous authority may well not have enough
precedential significance to justify spending much time on it. As
to such cases, not a great deal is lost by deciding them in
unpublished opinions.
Let me explain, though, some of the effects that this
practice can have on the psychology of judging. If, for example,
a precedent is cited, and the other side then offers a distinction,
and the judges on the panel cannot think of a good answer to the
distinction, but nevertheless, for some extraneous reason, wish
to reject it, they can easily do so through the device of an
abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the
wiser. (I don't say that judges are actually doing this-only that
the temptation exists.) Or if, after hearing argument, a judge in
conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but
also believes that the decision is hard to justify'under the law, he
or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other
members of the panel, by deciding the' casIe in an unpublished
opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug. Again, I'm
not saying that this has ever occurred in any particular case, but
a system that encourages this sort of behavior, or is at least open
to it, has to be subject to question in any world in which judges
are human beings.
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There is more: many cases with obvious legal importance
are being decided by unpublished opinions. Some unpublished
opinions-and, I must say, I believe this occurs more in other
circuits than in the Eighth-are fairly elaborate. They go for as
long as twenty pages. They contain citations and legal
reasoning. Occasionally they decide questions that anyone
would describe as important. Let me give an example from the
Eighth Circuit. In United States v. Kocourek, the question
presented was the constitutionality of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(j), which makes it unlawful for any person to "receive,
possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen
firearm.., which has been shipped or transported in, interstate
or foreign commerce." This provision contains no requirement
that interstate commerce be substantially affected, and it was
challenged as beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause, citing United States v. Lopez.! Our court's
opinion holds that the statute is valid. It does so in a paragraph.
The opinion, however, was marked not to be published, and one
can gain access to the full text only by way of the computer
citation, 1997 WL 307160, or by ordering a copy from our
Clerk's office.
I do not suggest that the judges on the Kocourek panel were
up to anything underhanded. Mr. Kocourek's appointed counsel
had filed what is known as an Anders brief.6 An Anders brief is a
way of saying that appointed counsel, in his or her best
professional judgment, sees nothing of substance in the appeal.
Once such a brief is filed, our normal practice is to allow
counsel to withdraw, invite the appellant to file his own brief pro
se, and then review the record on our own to see if there could
be any contention of merit.7 Such cases are normally referred to
our Staff Attorneys' office, which prepares a memorandum,
possibly including-a draft per curiam opinion, and sends it to a
panel of three judges, which we refer to as a "screening panel."
Screening-panel opinions are routinely unpublished. I suspect
that this is what happened in Kocourek, and that it simply did
4. 116 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (table).
5. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
7. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
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not occur to the panel to vary the customary practice and publish
the opinion.
The result, though, is that, at least if you believe what our
rule says, the question of the constitutionality of Section 9220)
is still open in this Circuit. If the question does arise before
another panel, moreover, it would be a violation of our rule for
the Kocourek case to be cited as precedent. The irony is
enhanced when you look at United States v. Luna.8 In that case,
the Fifth Circuit had before it the same question, a question of
first impression for that court'. The Fifth Circuit found Kocourek
on the computer, and cited the opinion as persuasive authority
on the way to its own holding that the statute is valid. (In the
Fifth Circuit, it should be noted, unpublished opinions do have
precedential value, and there is no -prohibition against citing
them.)
I have no comprehensive statistics to prove my next point,
but I have the strong feeling that the number of unpublished
opinions in the Eighth Circuit is on the rise. Every day we
receive a-printout from the Clerk's office listing the names and
docket numbers of opinions to be filed within the next few days,
and stating, also, whether the opinions are to be published or
not. The list for February 16-18, 1999, recently came across my
desk and caught my eye. The list appears on one page, and
contains twenty-two opinions. Of these, only four were to be
published.
This unpublished-opinion practice is creating a vast
underground body of law, fully accessible to the public at a
reasonable cost by way of computers, but disavowed by the very
judges who are producing it. If the reader will pardon a personal
reference, I have many times voted to change our rule on this
subject, not to require that every opinion be printed in a book,
but simply to allow lawyers to cite any opinion that they believe
would be helpful, and to acknowledge that judges must respect
what they have done in the past, whether or not it is printed in'a
book. In the beginning, my motions to repeal this rule died for
want of a second.9 Recently, some other members of this court
8. 165 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
9. Curiously, our Court has not always followed the rule. In McCoy v. Schweiker, 683
F.2d 1138, 1141 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), an unpublished opinion was cited as
authority on an important jurisdictional point. I deliberately included this citation in the
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have begun to join me. Other judges have expressed strong
reservations.
I close with a question. Article III of the Constitution of the
United States vests "judicial power" in the Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. We can exercise no power that is not "judicial."
That is all the power that we have. When a governmental
official, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a
previous day, without giving reasons, and perhaps for no reason
other than a change of mind, can the power that is being
exercised properly be called "judicial"? Is it not more like
legislative power, which can be exercised whenever the
legislator thinks best, and without regard to prior decisions? In
other words, is the assertion that unpublished opinions are not
precedent and cannot be cited a violation of Article III?
draft opinion when I circulated it, and all the members of the en banc Court concurred
without a murmur.
10. See, e.g., In re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, J., dissenting); National Classification
Comm'n v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., concurring);
In re Amendment of Section (Rule) 809.23(3), 456 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Wis. 1990)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
